This chapter documents the failed European attempt to keep to their part of
the transatlantic bargain by establishing a European Defence Community
(EDC). It then reports on how the United States and its allies cobbled
together in the London and Paris agreements arrangements to substitute for
the EDC and set the terms for the Federal Republic of Germany’s membership
in the alliance. The text argues that this outcome fundamentally altered the
original transatlantic bargain, making the alliance much more dependent on
American nuclear and non-nuclear forces.
This chapter pauses the historical narrative to take stock of some of the
factors that influenced the strengths and weaknesses of the transatlantic
alliance. It argues that NATO is more than a military alliance and that its
political role is critical to its success. It examines the aspects of
geography, history, ideology, international and regional roles, and
capabilities that affect alliance relationships. It then shines a light on
the perpetual burden-sharing issue that has been part of the alliance from
the beginning and will likely persist for as long as the alliance
In the second half of the 1950s, Bonn refused to establish official diplomatic relations with Israel – a seeming contradiction of its initial stance on the Jewish state. Worse still, in December 1959 an unprecedented number of anti-Semitic attacks orchestrated by Stasi agents took place across the Federal Republic, reigniting deep anti-German feelings among the global public and damaging West Germany’s public image (Ansehen) – right on the eve of the very first personal encounter between Chancellor Adenauer and David Ben Gurion. Yet while the option of diplomatic relations with Israel faded, covert cooperation in the fields of security and commerce intensified. Offering a fresh take on the issue, the chapter shows how the FRG managed to use its rivalry against the GDR to its own advantage – both to justify not establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel as well as to deflect Arab suspicion regarding the actual degree and realms of cooperation between the Federal Republic and the State of Israel.
The book closes with an epilogue that summarises the argument of the book and outlines the implications for our understanding of the Cold War and of the special relationship between Germany and Israel. It argues that the German–German Cold War was, from the start, deeply interlinked with the Arab–Israeli conflict, and that this overlap was far more complex, and had much wider repercussions, than is generally acknowledged. The epilogue also reflects on questions that transcend the content of the individual chapters, reflecting on post-genocidal international reconciliation and the weight of the past in international politics.
Chapter 3 spells out the strategies put in place in each Germany to wage their Cold War in the Middle East. The chapter examines the intensifying East German efforts to drive a wedge between West Germany and its Arab partners; to use the question of the FRG’s readiness to pay reparations to Israel to galvanise the German population against the Luxembourg Agreement; and to resist Israeli demands that East Germany, too, pay reparations to the Jewish state. Special attention is also paid to two West German political manoeuvres: the efforts to placate Arab concerns on the economic and military strength of the State of Israel following the signing of the Luxembourg Agreement, and the use of the agreement as a tool to bolster West Germany’s claim to international legitimacy. The chapter challenges the view that Arab–Israeli and Cold War rivalries started intertwining following the 1955 arms deal between Nasser’s Egypt and Communist Czechoslovakia. In fact, as this and the previous chapter show, by the early 1950s the Arab–Israeli conflict and the German–German Cold War were already firmly entangled.
The second part of the book commences with the Suez Crisis, and explores how the German–German and Arab–Israeli power struggles played out in the second half of the 1950s. Chapter 4 builds upon minutes of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) meetings, analyses of the West German intelligence services (BND), and assessments of the US National Security Council. These documents show that, as domestic and international crises developed in the second half of the 1950s, each Germany found itself increasingly at odds with its respective superpower patron. This deeply influenced German policy-makers and their perceptions of each Germany’s international role. On the one hand, the consequences of the Suez Crisis spread insecurity among the West German political elite regarding the extent of the American readiness to protect the interests of its Western European partners. On the other hand, East German leader Walter Ulbricht became increasingly intolerant of the Soviet constraints on East German overtures to Middle Eastern partners. Thus, the GDR intensified its international propaganda campaign against West Germany, focusing especially on the West German–Israeli entente to woo Arab audiences, with mixed results.
The first part of the book opens in the late 1940s. Chapter 1 traces the early discussions between future representatives of West Germany, East Germany and the State of Israel. From 1949 onward, the question of German reparations to Israel began to acquire ever greater significance. The chapter challenges the widely held assumption that East Germany was, from the outset, hostile to the State of Israel, and revises the general portrayal of West Germany’s readiness to pay reparations to Israel as a grand moral gesture. Indeed, the chapter emphasises the early openness of representatives of the Soviet occupation zone (until 1949, later the German Democratic Republic, GDR) to sustaining Israel’s efforts to integrate Jewish refugees from Europe in Palestine and places Adenauer’s declaration on the question of reparations within the wider context of the reintegration of many former Nazis inside West German political institutions, including the embryonic West German Foreign Ministry.
Gender Equality and Culture in Humanitarian Action
Ricardo Fal-Dutra Santos
Despite increasing attention to gender issues in the humanitarian sector, the
notion of gender equality as a humanitarian goal remains largely rejected, as
some argue it would require interfering with cultural values and practices, and
thus lie beyond the remit of humanitarianism. This paper questions this by
examining the close relationship between certain humanitarian goals, and
cultural values and practices. It ultimately calls for a gender-transformative
humanitarian action that recognises and supports local feminist actors, in an
effort to transform gender relations both in local communities and within
This review examines the appropriateness of including men within the existing
sexual and gender-based violence programming in armed conflict settings rather
than providing services explicitly designed to address their needs. A central
premise of the paper is that men experience sexual violence differently to women
and that the way they seek help also varies. This gender-specific difference
calls into question why humanitarian organisations pursue a
‘gender-inclusion’ approach, which simply extends services
designed for women to men. There is a need to reconsider this approach, and
specifically its implementation. The paper reviews relevant secondary sources
and argues that current practices of sexual and gender-based violence
programming fail to translate into actionable responses suited for and sensitive