This chapter shows the way in which official and non-official thinking in Britain drew up its agenda for the post-war period during the war. It examines, in somewhat less detail than for the United States, the machinery, practice and thinking of various key groupings within British official and non-official circles to show how they interacted. The chapter also shows how these processes chimed, or did not so agree, with thinking already described in the United States. Britain developed an approach to the future that was to have elements of harmony, but also elements of discord, with the American new world order (NWO). They were very suspicious initially of both the American plans for an NWO as a plot against socialism but persuaded themselves that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's commitment to the Atlantic Charter gave them a mandate to transform British society.
This chapter reflects a key phase in the Northern Ireland peace process. It addresses the next steps that would need to be taken to pave the way for true reconciliation. It reflects on three important issues; building prosperity; tackling sectarianism; and ensuring that the peace process must leave no one behind.
This chapter examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. The essence of the dilemma for Woodrow Wilson and his colleagues at Versailles was that there had never been an attempt at a 'worldwide settlement', and indeed there has never been one since. The First World War has arguably had the longest lasting and deepest effect of all the events of the twentieth century. The First World War acted as the catalyst for the emergence of an New World Order (NWO) agenda that has undergone constant evolution ever since while maintaining its basic essence. At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 the leaders of the West, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Vittorio Orlando, had to try and resurrect the phoenix of peace and prosperity from the ashes of war.
This chapter shows how new world order (NWO) architects thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. One of the key Wilsonian principles encapsulated in the Fourteen Points was the creation of an international organisation that would help to solve the problems of what Inis Claude rightly calls an 'interstate' system. The chapter discusses the failure of the League of Nations (LON) and the problem of how to solve the security problems of Europe came a renewed belief in the idea of a global organisation. It focuses on what can be seen to be the enduring debates about security in the international organisation context, those on the causes of war and the conditions for peace. The chapter describes the mechanisms of the LON and United Nation (UN) agencies.
Drawing on his background in Derry and in the European Parliament, John Hume explains his philosophy of peace, paying tribute to Tip O’Neill and other American politicians who worked for peace in Ireland. He sets out how Nationalists and Unionists have to face up to the challenge of respect for difference. He argues that the principles behind the European Union and the United States are basically the same.
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explains the diplomatic history and contemporaneous literature about the genesis of the 'new world order' (NWO) of the twentieth century. It examines both the motivations and actions of the principal political actors and groups of decision makers during the periods 1914-19 and 1939-45. The book conveys the heart of what is an essentially 'Anglo-American' body of thought and practice. The twentieth century has also seen a voluminous literature reflecting on peace and war, which has been constantly drawn upon by leaders to feed their imaginations and whose hopes and aspirations they hoped to fulfil. Hence H.G. Wells or Norman Angell are as much to be acknowledged as creators of the new world order imaginings of 1918-19 as Woodrow Wilson.
This chapter aims to elucidate that policy process, particularly as it applied to the future of Germany and, by extension, the whole of Europe. It shows how the Allies interacted as they went about this policy-making process. The purpose of this is twofold: first to show that the resulting compromises in effect gave rise to tensions that were to be both creative and negative. Second, the aim is to show how the ideological tensions that became evident prepared the ground for the Cold War confrontation that was to follow Franklin Delano Roosevelt's death in April 1945. The chapter deals with the mechanisms of the new world order (NWO) planning process. The onset of the Cold War heralded the creation of what were essentially two 'NWOs', one under the aegis of the Soviet Union, the other dominated, but not exclusively controlled, by the United States.
This chapter takes a particular focus on the role of the United Nations in helping people in fractured societies to work together to build a lasting peace. It identifies nine lessons: say no when we need to; know where you are going; know the context; never neglect security; manage expectations; stay on course; get the sequencing right; keep everyone on the same page; local populations should take responsibility. It argues that the most important lessons of all is that we must be listening looking out for new knowledge.
Fears about the deterioration of press freedom in Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin have been widely discussed since his election in March 2000. Concerns with regards to adverse developments of press freedom under Putin have been voiced particularly about the closure of independent broadcast and print media outlets in recent years. This chapter discusses developments in the sphere of mass media and information in Russia under the Putin leadership through the framework of securitisation. First, it discusses media coverage of terrorism and elections and looks at government attempts to securitise such coverage. It then considers the secrecy of policy making in the media sphere and examines the obstruction of the activities of commercial and foreign media in the country. The chapter concludes that ‘behind the scenes’ involvement of security forces in the handling and regulation of the media sphere seems to have made a considerable contribution to the securitisation of the media sphere and to the perception that media freedom in contemporary Russia is deteriorating.