International Relations

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Introduction

Language and politics

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Richard Jackson

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book is about the public language of the 'war on terrorism' and the way in which language has been deployed to justify and normalise a global campaign of counter-terrorism. The book has two primary goals. First, it seeks to explore the nature of the overarching narrative or story of the 'war on terrorism': its main themes and appeals, its forms and expressions and the kinds of cultural and political myths that it encompasses. Second, it explains how the language of the 'war on terrorism' has become the dominant political paradigm in American foreign policy since September 11, 2001, and the different kinds of reality-making affects that the adoption of this language has.

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Introduction

The EU and the governance of European security

Emil Kirchner and James Sperling

In its earliest manifestation, the European project was explicitly a security project. The evolution of the European state towards a post-Westphalian identity is perhaps the most fundamental change that has taken place in the modern European state system. The contemporary threats posed to European stability are generally aimed 'above' and 'below' the state. The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the Thessoloniki European Council in December 2003, singled out terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as the five key threats facing the EU. The study of security governance in geographical Europe has generally focused on two distinct features. First, the institutional characteristics of governance, with particular attention directed to the geographical boundary of those governance structures and second, a marked tendency to emphasise the military aspects of security and consequently the role of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

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Introduction

Policymaking and intelligence on Iraq

James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book examines the intellectual frameworks within which the case for war in Iraq was developed in the US and UK. It analyzes the neoconservative roots of the decision to go to war and traces the evolution of neoconservative thinking on foreign and security policy issues, highlighting the complexity of, and potential contradictions within, neoconservative thought. The book looks at the parallel processes through which President George H. W. Bush's administration and Tony Blair's government constructed their cases for war, analyzing similarities and divergences in the approach. It examines how the Bush administration tried to manage public opinion in support of its war policies. The book also looks at the decisionmaking process of the Bush administration in the year before the war in Iraq.

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Introduction

The problématique of culture in international conflict analysis

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Tarja Väyrynen

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book. The book develops a non-totalist understanding of international conflict resolution in general, and of problem-solving conflict resolution in particular. It seeks a non-totalist understanding by studying conflict and conflict resolution in the light of constructionist ideas of the social world. The book examines John Burton's conflict and conflict resolution theory and its relation to his human needs theory. By applying phenomenological concepts, an understanding of conflict and conflict resolution can be gained which differs in many respects from Burton's theories. The most important point of departure is the account of culture, which Alfred Schutz's theories provide for conflict and conflict resolution theory. The book concludes with practical suggestions for international problem-solving conflict resolution.

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Michelle Bentley

Open Access (free)

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Raymond Hinnebusch

This text aims to fill a gap in the field of Middle Eastern political studies by combining international relations theory with concrete case studies. It begins with an overview of the rules and features of the Middle East regional system—the arena in which the local states, including Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab states of Syria, Jordan and Iraq, operate. The book goes on to analyse foreign-policy-making in key states, illustrating how systemic determinants constrain this policy-making, and how these constraints are dealt with in distinctive ways depending on the particular domestic features of the individual states. Finally, it goes on to look at the outcomes of state policies by examining several major conflicts including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf War, and the system of regional alignment. The study assesses the impact of international penetration in the region, including the historic reasons behind the formation of the regional state system. It also analyses the continued role of external great powers, such as the United States and the former Soviet Union, and explains the process by which the region has become incorporated into the global capitalist market.

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Paul R. Pillar

The most serious problem with US intelligence is that its relationship with the policymaking process is broken and badly needs repair. Public discussion of prewar intelligence on Iraq has focused on the errors made in assessing Saddam Hussein's unconventional weapons programs. The intelligence community limits its judgments to what is happening or what might happen overseas, avoiding policy judgments about what the United States should do in response. The George H. W. Bush administration deviated from the professional standard not only in using policy to drive intelligence, but also in aggressively using intelligence to win public support for its decision to go to war. In its report on prewar intelligence concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said it found no evidence that analysts had altered or shaped their judgments in response to political pressure.

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Intelligence collection and analysis on Iraq

Issues for the intelligence community

Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan and Aris Pappas

The intelligence community's uneven performance on Iraq from 2002 to 2004 raised significant questions concerning the condition of intelligence collection, analysis, and policy support. The central focus of national intelligence reporting and analysis prior to the war was the extent of the Iraqi programs for developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Iraqis took pains to carefully hide their WMD programs. The Iraqis had learned well about US intelligence during more than 10 years of confrontation and war. No single act of omission or commission accounts for the inconsistent analytic performance of the intelligence community with regard to Iraq. It appears to be the result of decisions made, and not made, since the fall of the Soviet Union, which had an impact on the analytical environment analogous to the effect of the meteor strikes on the dinosaurs.

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Edited by: James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian

This book examines the intellectual frameworks within which the case for war in Iraq has developed in the US and the UK. It analyzes the neoconservative roots of the decision to go to war. The book also analyzes the humanitarian intervention rationale that was developed in the context of the Kosovo campaign, Tony Blair's presentation of it, and the case of Iraq. It looks at the parallel processes through which the George Bush administration and Blair government constructed their cases for war, analyzing similarities and divergences in approach. The book considers the loci of the intelligence failure over Iraq, the lessons for the intelligence communities, and the degree to which the decision to go to war in Iraq represented a policy rather than an intelligence failure. It then complements the analyses of US prewar intelligence failures by analysing what post-war inquiries have revealed about the nature of the failure in the UK case. The book discusses the relationship between intelligence and policymaking. It looks at how US Congress dealt with intelligence before the war. The book also examines how the Bush administration tried to manage public opinion in support of its war policies. It then looks at the decisionmaking process of the Bush administration in the year before the war in Iraq. Finally, the book also provides excerpts from a number of speeches and documents which are key to understanding the nature of national security decisionmaking and intelligence failure.

Open Access (free)

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Raymond Hinnebusch

This chapter notes that the incongruity of identity and territory continues to destabilise the politics of the Middle East and to significantly qualify the Westphalian model. While Arab states have consolidated their sovereignty in the face of supra-state ideology, in the making of foreign policy, legitimacy requires their leaders must still balance between the two. Inter-Arab politics arguably remains qualitatively different from ‘international’ politics. Irredentist conflicts continue to bedevil two near-nation-states, Turkey and Israel. Meanwhile, Iran embraces its communal mosaic and projects its foreign policy under an Islamic banner.