This chapter looks at the doctrinal principles of clinical negligence. The civil law of negligence is designed to provide compensation for one individual injured by another’s negligence. Clinical negligence involves certain special factors.
In this chapter we consider the schemes by which patients seek accountability when things go wrong with their or their relatives’ treatment. We consider the interaction between mechanisms designed to provide answers and redress for patients and those that seek to ensure learning to improve patient safety. In the second part of the chapter, we consider criticisms of the tort system and alternative proposals.
How far are choices around conception, pregnancy and childbirth protected by health professionals and the law? And what legal action can parents and children take when things go wrong? This chapter explores the issues and the claims. We explore recent developments in the law relating to wrongful conception, birth and life including actions by or on behalf of children under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976. And we look at issues relating to the protection of maternal autonomy, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In this new chapter to the 7th edition, we examine criminal law and medical negligence, asking when a doctor’s malpractice engages criminal liability. The role of the criminal law in addressing medical malpractice is contested. The decision in the case of rogue breast surgeon Ian Paterson opens the door to an increased possibility that non-fatal malpractice may result in prosecution, eliminating the element of moral luck inherent in gross negligence manslaughter. And the recent case of Dr Bawa-Garba raises serious questions about the impact of the criminal process on healthcare practice.
The single certainty in human life is that we shall die. Death cannot be evaded, albeit it may be delayed. Medical technology has created real questions about just how we identify the threshold between dying but alive, and death itself. The development of transplantation played a major role in prompting doctors to rethink definitions of death. It would be wrong to conclude that a desire to maximise the number of viable organs suitable for transplant is the only or the most important factor in the imperative need to define the moment of death. The question is far from straightforward and a legal definition of death is required for several purposes.
In this chapter, we examine the law governing doctors’ relationships with child patients. The courts are often asked to determine the fate of sick children when doctors and parents disagree about how best to care for the child. Several recent cases (eg Gard, Evans, Haastrup, Raqeeb) attracted publicity when parents and the medical team disagreed about whether to withdraw or maintain life support for young children. Some cases involve, not disagreement between doctors and parents, but disputes between parents themselves. On the opposite side of the coin, are there limits to treatment to which a parent may agree on behalf of the child? As a child matures, common sense dictates that they be allowed to take more decisions for themselves. Gillick appeared to establish a right to adolescent autonomy. It proved to be an odd sort of ‘right’, a right to say yes but not to say no.
This chapter considers patient rights. The first part of the chapter focuses on the European Convention on Human Rights and its impact on domestic medical law. The second part considers access to healthcare and resource allocation.
In this new chapter to the 7th edition, we consider the regulation of research on the embryo and its moral implications. We consider the benefits it has to offer and the limitations imposed in law.
In this chapter we explore a range of ethical and legal dilemmas at the end of life. From mercy killing to involuntary euthanasia to assisted dying we consider the legal approaches to protecting dignity, autonomy and reverence for life in decisions about death and dying.
In this chapter we consider in particular:
(1) The authority to carry out research on the human adult derives from that person’s consent. How satisfactory are the principles governing consent to participation in clinical research?
(2) The law on medical treatment demands that the physician respects the confidences of their patients. How does this translate into medical research?
(3) What provision does the law make for an individual suffering injury in the course of their participation in such clinical research?