Philosophy and Critical Theory
In this chapter, the merits of Erich Fromm’s account of social pathology are advanced. Fromm’s work is shown to avoid many of the pitfalls which beleaguer contemporary critical theory as he understands the very normalcy of the social conjuncture to be part of the social pathology itself. This is shown to be at clear variance from Honneth’s normative reconstructive method. Fromm’s framing of social pathology is held to offer an excellent foundation for social research today as he recentres market irrationalities with a humanist Marxism.
In this chapter, the importance of Hegelian-Marxism to social pathology diagnosis is charted. While Rousseau had stressed that human needs could be artificially induced, Hegelian-Marxists argue that the very form of thought, not merely thought contents, could be socially denatured. The distortion of the subject’s consciousness was held to be linked to pathologies of reason which emanate from a pathological system of production and distribution. The importance of such insights for the potency of pathology diagnosing social critique is presented through a critical engagement with the post-metaphysical standpoint of Habermas and Honneth.
In this chapter, I lay bare the fault lines within contemporary critical theory. That critical theory once offered a powerful and distinctive approach to social research is established, yet such diagnostic potency has been ‘domesticated’. The problems brought about by the recent foundational change in the research programme’s social-theoretical foundations are introduced, with Axel Honneth’s form of ‘recognition theory’ identified as a primary culprit. The possibility of an alternative social-theoretical foundation for critical theory is foregrounded, built upon a marriage of the work of Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse.
In this chapter, insights from Erich Fromm are married to those from Herbert Marcuse. I argue that while Fromm’s account of pathological normalcy offers a robust theoretical foundation, Marcuse’s framing of repressive desublimation and of the technical a priori offers operationalisable avenues for contemporary social research. While it is acknowledged that Fromm and Marcuse both presented very different Freudo-Marxisms, this is read as offering a productive tension born out of ‘sibling rivalry’, rather than indicating an insurmountable incompatibility.
In this chapter, I chart the rise of a ‘Finnish School’ and an ‘Essex School’ of critical theory. Both are shown to have fused Honneth’s work on social pathology and his critical theory of recognition into a ‘pathologies of recognition’ perspective. The many and varied limitations of this approach are charted. Honneth’s own work is shown to have adopted a radically recognition-cognitivist framing of social pathology, especially within Freedom’s Right. The social-theoretical limitations, philosophical antinomies, and political betrayals of this marriage are detailed and expanded upon.
In this chapter, I commence my reconstruction of the pathology diagnosing tradition upon which critical theory is built. Rousseau’s sophisticated theoretical apparatus is detailed and the merits of reading Rousseau as a social pathologist underscored. Rousseau is presented as being an ideal thinker to return to when reconsidering the framing of social pathology in light of today’s restrictive ‘pathologies of recognition’ orthodoxy, as Rousseau combines an analysis of recognition pathologies within a broad and multilateral diagnosis. The influence Rousseau had on critical theory is stressed through a reading of Lukács.
In this chapter, I introduce social pathology, explaining how and why it is so central to the Frankfurt School. The distinctive syncretism the framing enables is detailed, and an inclusive and expansive definition of pathology is adopted. The merits of pathology diagnosing critique are explored and the philosophical and political merits of the approach justified through an extended engagement with post-structuralist and post-modernist critics.
Chapter 3 focuses on the ‘making of citizens’ through education. Education in liberal democracies represents a possible corrective mechanism for inequalities among future citizens. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds should get an equal chance for inclusion into society through the education system. However, the chapter argue that in practice education can also be structured in such a way that it actively creates the fringes of citizenship. Using an intersectional reading, this chapter analyses how states justify school segregation of Romani children as a legitimate measure. It looks at four cases of school segregation at the European Court of Human Rights: D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic (2007), ‘Sampanis and Others v. Greece (2008), Oršuš and Others v. Croatia (2010) and Sampani and Others v. Greece (2012) – to argue that state discourses either denied the existence of segregation or portrayed it as a beneficial measure for Romani children to ‘catch up’ with the majority language. The chapter compares these cases with the reasoning present in US court cases on African American children and school segregation. It shows that in the US case segregation was legal on paper, whilst in the European cases segregation was prohibited. Still, in both cases segregation remains as one of the fringes of citizenship both for Roma and African American children.
The Conclusion summarises the main findings of all the previous chapters in order to theoretically grasp the invisible edges of citizenship and the fringes of citizenship. It concludes that in order to understand marginalisation further research on the structural mechanisms leading to marginalisation needs to be conducted. It rejects the claim that marginalisation is incidental and directly points to the mechanisms that produce it. It also rejects the claim that Roma and other marginalised minorities are themselves to blame for marginalisation, discrimination and their exclusion from society, where they should be included as citizens. It discards the claim that Roma are just passive observers of their position. Rather, they do address it and subvert it: the subversion at the fringes of citizenship, I argue, also carries the potential for the reconstruction of citizenship itself to become truly inclusive and without invisible edges. The Conclusion also identifies some critical policy guidelines on how the invisible edges of citizenship could be avoided in the future.
Numerous scholars and policymakers have highlighted the predicament of Roma as the most disadvantaged ethnic minority in Europe. This predicament has often been discussed as an unfortunate anomaly within otherwise inclusive liberal democratic states.
In this book, Julija Sardelić offers a novel socio-legal enquiry into the position of Roma as marginalised citizens in Europe. Whilst acknowledging previous research on ethnic discrimination, racism and the socio-economic disadvantages Roma face in Europe, she discusses civic marginalisation from the perspective of global citizenship studies. She argues that the Romani minorities in Europe are unique, but the approaches of civic marginalisation Roma have faced are not. States around the globe have applied similar legislation and policies that have made traditionally settled minorities marginalised. These may have seemed inclusive to all citizens or have been designed to improve the position of minority citizens yet they have often actively contributed to the construction of civic marginalisation. The book looks at civic marginalisation by examining topics such as free movement and migration, statelessness and school segregation as well as how minorities respond to marginalisation. It shows how marginalised minorities can have a wide spectrum of ‘multicultural rights’ and still face racism and significant human rights violations. To understand such a paradox, Sardelić offers new theoretical concepts, such as the invisible edges of citizenship and citizenship fringes.