In this chapter, the author explains how the all subjected principle is seen
in terms of a purely protective neo-republicanism, which is distinguished
from the democratic republican self-government of citizenship stakeholding.
She re-examines the interpretation of the neo-republican non-domination
account that Rainer Bauböck associates with the all subjected principle. The
connection between non-domination and autonomy leads beyond domination to
the kind of self-government among related individuals that Bauböck
associates with his citizenship stakeholder account. The author argues that
a modified version of the all subjected principle escapes a number of the
criticisms levelled at it, and provides a clear basis for membership of the
demos. Finally, she offers future continuing subjection as a more defensible
basis for birthright citizenship while ensuring the continuity of the
democratic political community.
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts discussed in
this book. The book focuses on the principles that guide citizens of a
democratic polity and their representatives when considering whose interests
should count in their political decisions, whom to offer protection, and
whom to include in their midst as citizens. The principles are meant to
establish democratic legitimacy through inclusion in a world structured by
political boundaries. The book proposes that all affected interests (AAI),
all subject to coercion (ASC) and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS) each
address a specific aspect of democratic inclusion, but that only ACS applies
to membership issues. It considers the following three ideas: democracy as
popular self-government, as government directly accountable to citizens, and
as a method for making collectively binding decisions. The book aims to
combine these ideas with the corresponding inclusion principles into a
comprehensive conception of democratic inclusion for democratic
In this chapter, the author interrogates Rainer Bauböck's stakeholder model
as a matter of theory and highlights possibly unsustainable empirical
assumptions behind it. The intergenerational qualities of citizenship are
central to Bauböck's analysis. Bauböck understands that citizenship persists
only where boundaries exist and where populations remain relatively
sedentary. The author utilizes the archetypes of diaspora communities to
critique his position on citizenship inside and outside the territory of the
state. Diaspora communities may be disconnected from the political community
of their state of residence even as they maintain a strong intergenerational
connection qualifying as stakeholder citizenship in the homeland. Local
territorial membership also supplies a useful vehicle for interrogating
stakeholder citizenship. The incidence of instrumental citizenship will
continue to grow, further undermining the empirical premises of stakeholder
Rainer Bauböck has offered a fascinating and wide-ranging analysis of a
question that is often now referred to as "the democratic boundary problem".
This chapter begins to discuss how a democracy might function, what decision
rules it should use, and how it should be constituted. It addresses
questions of jurisdiction first, and concludes that, for economic and other
reasons, it makes sense to have a single state in the region covered by the
state of Israel and the occupied territories. The chapter considers the
composition of the citizen body who should govern it, as well as other
questions concerning the institutional form that democracy should take in
that area. It illustrates how one-state or the two-state solution makes a
difference, whether the question is about jurisdiction or about inclusion in
Often presented as a proto-totalitarian, Rousseau has traditionally been seen as an opponent of constitutionalism, checks and balances, and the separation of powers. Following a brief overview of the history of constitutionalism (from Moses to the French Revolution), this chapter compares Rousseau's political writings with the writings of constitutionalists like James Madison and Baron de Montesquieu. It shows that Rousseau shared the view that checks and balances are necessary for preventing the corruption of power and that he advocated a system of the separation of powers (and spoke highly of the British constitution. Yet, contrary to the other constitutionalists, Rousseau was a democrat. Whereas Montesquieu and Madison wanted the elites to check the elites (through the introduction of second chambers and constitutional courts), Rousseau emphasised that the executive ought to be checked by the people. He thus anticipated the political system that was instated by the American populists (including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson). However, unlike other constitutionalists, Rousseau did not believe that institutions themselves would be sufficient for creating a good polity. He ceaselessly emphasised that political education was necessary for creating a good society.
Previously unrecognised by scholars of nationalism, Rousseau was, in fact, the founder of the modern doctrine of nationalism. This chapter shows how Rousseau succeeded in developing a case for social cohesion and the necessity of having a common culture in a society. In developing a case for nationalism as a ‘civic profession of faith’ he continued—and redeveloped—a doctrine begun by Machiavelli, which was later to be further elaborated by Alexis de Tocqueville and present-day theorists and practitioners of social capital, like the political scientist Robert Putnam and the English politician David Blunkett. It is argued that Rousseau accomplished the feat of developing a new doctrine of civic religion (i.e., nationalism) and that he succeeded in combining a defence for this doctrine with a new place for Christianity (which was consistent with the original apolitical teachings of Christ). The chapter also presents an account of Rousseau's thinking on international politics, including something as timely as an account of his opposition against the establishment of a European superstate.
This chapter outlines the major philosophical problem for Rousseau: the burden of modernity. It gives an account of Rousseau's place in the emerging world of modernity, and his opposition to secularism and scientism. It shows how his general philosophical—and theological—opposition to modernity underpinned his moral philosophy. Unlike liberal or utilitarian thinkers, Rousseau sought to base his moral judgements on emotions and sensibility, not on rational calculations. It is shown how this made him overcome the poverty of ethical theory that has characterised modernity—and how Rousseau invented post-modernism (with a pre-modern face). The chapter also contains a section on Rousseau's economic philosophy, in which it is shown that he—like Adam Smith—succeeded in transcending the economic theories of mercantilists and physiocrats. An analysis of the relationship between Rousseau and Burke is also presented. Often seen as adversaries, the chapter shows that Rousseau and Burke, in fact, were in agreement on the majority of issues, including opposition to revolutionary change, reverence for religion, and a preference for gradual reform.
This chapter presents an account of Rousseau's philosophy of music. Music was Rousseau's main passion, and this passion spilled over into his political writings in more ways than one. The whole tenor of his prose had a musical aura about it. His works were composed rather than written—which, perhaps, explains his eloquence. Readers of Rousseau's work in the original French have been struck by the rhythmical patterns. This musical quality was not unintended. Through the melodious tone he wanted to prove a philosophical point. Musicheld the key to restoring our original emotions, that natural ‘goodness of man’, which manifested itself in the natural compassion with suffering, weak, and unfortunate individuals. It is, perhaps, indicative that Rousseau—the thinker of natural goodness of man and a composer—never tired of stressing that music and song was man's first impulse.
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to re-open a dialogue with the classics. It attempts not only to see the masters in context—as has become popular among modern thinkers—but rather to seek inspiration from the great minds to deal with contemporary political problems. Rousseau—and indeed any other classic—is politically relevant only if he reveals timeless insights. If a classic cannot inspire he is nothing, and is better confined to the dustbin of failed political doctrines. This book is based on the premise that Rousseau speaks through the ages. It seeks to show that Rousseau, while he may not have the answers to contemporary problems, at the very least provides new angles and perspectives on the debate.
This chapter presents some conclusions and shows that there was an internal coherence in Rousseau's thought. As befits a classical thinker, Rousseau's contribution to Western philosophy was rich in detail and even broader in scope. Like other critics of modernity, his philosophy was a showdown with a society marred by Godless materialism, absurd social inequalities, and unnatural inter-human relations. Men, argued Rousseau, would not be set free if left to himself. Liberty, as understood by Rousseau, could only be acquired once man had reconciled his natural, spiritual, and social sides of himself with the requirements of living in an advanced civilisation. He further argued that men could only be free when—or if—they recognised the imperatives of living in a family, in a republic and in harmony with a universe created by God.