Chapter 4 extends the class struggle to three further categories: political parties, state institutions and struggles in the social factory of capitalism. It questions to what extent the ruling class can transcend their economic vested interests – the economic-corporate phase – in articulating pro-membership on a universal terrain in the 2000s for the hegemonic moment in political and civil society. It also questions whether counter-hegemonic social forces can transcend their economic corporate phase and contest pro-membership in political and civil society. Can struggles around ecology, feminism and human rights form a united struggle with the labour movement? The book argues that the pro-membership project was hegemonic in the 2000s as ideas associated with membership were defended on universal terms in political and civil society. I suggest that, rather than one project for and one project opposing membership, there were two rival class strategies contesting pro-membership: neo-mercantilism and Ha–vet (‘No–Yes’), neither of which provided an overall alternative. The former opposed the capitalist nature of European integration and supported Social Europe under the motto ‘Another Europe is possible’; the latter advocated ‘membership on equal terms and conditions’, supporting membership so long as Turkey would benefit from the EU’s social policy, structural funds and the free movement of workers.
Chapter 1 has two aims. It introduces the conceptual framework, operationalises the research design and lays out the main coordinates of intra-class struggle. It then engages with the post-Marxist critique. Post-structural and post-Marxist critique has become pre-eminent, referring to social change in capitalism through deindustrialisation, digitalisation, rising individualism and identity politics. For instance, Laclau and Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) criticise Marxism for class and economic reductionism, while Hardt and Negri in Empire (2000) assert that postmodernisation of the global economy necessitates a new political imaginary. In response, scholars within historical materialism claim that social relations of production remain central. I address various important questions raised by this debate: Does historical materialism overlook plural forms of social antagonisms, thereby confining agency to production and class? How do Marxist scholars respond to these critiques? After laying out disagreements, the book argues that post-Marxism operates within capitalism’s dualisms, a condition that ‘de-socialises the material’. In contrast, historical materialism goes beyond ideational-material dualism to present the struggle within the sphere of social reproduction as an internal relationship in a dialectical manner – in agreement with van der Pijl (1998) that it is the ‘discipline of capital over the entire reproductive system’ that has to be resisted. Bieler and Morton (2018) locate it as ‘class struggle in the social factory of capitalism’. Accordingly, alternatives to EU membership and struggles over political recognition – e.g. feminist and ecological struggles – are discussed as class struggle in the capitalist discipline in the following empirical chapters.
Chapter 2 situates Turkey–EU relations within the uneven development of global capitalism and highlights particular coordinates of class struggle historically. This prepares the ground for debating the struggle among social forces in the following three empirical chapters. The analysis is structured on three levels, the social relations of production, the form of the state, and the world order within three distinct historical periods: the Fordist period of the 1960s and 1970s; the neoliberal turn in the 1980s; the post-2007 authoritarian neoliberal period. Turkey–EU relations are analysed at the end of each section. How can we read Turkey’s transition to capitalism under structural conditions of uneven exchange? How has neoliberal restructuring impacted Turkey–EU relations? How have the Great Recession and the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism transformed the future trajectory of Turkey–EU relations? The book argues that, during Keynesian embedded liberalism, relations reflected a tug of war between social forces in favour of industrialisation by protectionism versus liberalisation by the Customs Union. Following the neoliberal turn, Turkey applied for membership in 1987 and participated in the Customs Union in 1995 in the absence of a labour perspective. Turkey’s AKP regime is then read as trasformismo in the 2000s as a condition of the formation of an ever more extensive ruling class. The AKP government has resorted to coercive policies in the 2010s in tandem with the crisis of neoliberal hegemony and dependent financialisation. Turkey–EU relations are not centred around membership but involve transactional cooperation around issue-specific areas such as migration, visa liberalisation and person-to-person cooperation.
This introduces the topic and uncovers how Turkey–EU relations have been debated in the literature. It then explains why the proposed book adapts a historical materialist perspective and reads relations as the uneven and combined development of capitalism as an instance of class struggle for hegemony. In the 2000s, membership debate was very much alive with enlargement being a popular topic in European politics, while Turkey as an emerging market and a candidate country was conducting the reform process. Contrarily, the 2010s is described through deglobalisation, with the growth strategy of developing countries based on delocalisation of production coming to its limits, while Turkey is turning into a more authoritarian regime under the presidential regime. Turkey’s membership is off the agenda both in Turkey and Europe. Rather than a rupture, historical materialism paves the way to read the relations of the last two decades as creating dependence on Europe’s periphery with different set of policy tools. This chapter examines how Turkey–EU relations are studied in each decade in the history of relations and how historical materialism contributes to debate. The book argues that there are four merits of adapting a historical materialist perspective: integrating structure into the analysis; questioning power relations and the socio-economic content of ongoing integration; unravelling agency regarding who supports or contests membership, thereby opening the debate for alternatives; analysing economics and politics (state–society relations) as integral for each historical specificity.
The proposed book aims to explain the divergent coordinates of Turkey’s EU membership bid in the last two decades as an instance of class struggle by embarking on two historical materialist categories: uneven development and hegemony. In the 2000s, Turkey was referred as an emerging market, a model with moderate Islam, a market economy and a candidate for EU membership. In the 2010s, enlargement has been off the agenda, with the EU’s credibility to consolidate democracy on its periphery being questioned, while Turkey has become more authoritarian under its new presidential regime. The book questions whether there is any pro-membership project in Turkey and whether there are any alternatives in the last two decades. The analyses rely on interviews conducted in İstanbul and Ankara around three research trips at two different historical conjunctures. The book argues that while the pro-membership project was hegemonic, it was contested by two rival class strategies during the 2000s: neo-mercantilism and Ha–vet (No–Yes). In the 2010s, pro-membership is no longer hegemonic with its social forces encountering difficulties in providing ‘moral and intellectual leadership’ for subordinate social forces in society. Social forces supporting rival class strategies increase their critical tone given the economic disparities between Europe’s core and periphery and rising populist politics in Europe. Yet an overall alternative to the pro-membership project of the 2010s hasn’t emerged, and there has been a failure to develop a universally appealing project.
This chapter digs into the heart of what the book sets out to understand, by looking at how women are funnelled into far-right and white nationalist communities via digital pipelines. It draws on previous academic research into algorithmic bias, radicalisation and networked misogyny. It explores several different models of radicalisation including those from the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and RAND. It also explores the author’s own experiences of monitoring and joining digital far-right communities, such as Telegram channels, to examine the kinds of content and discussions that are used to recruit women and girls.
This chapter seeks to provide historic context behind the roles women play in far-right communities, as well as how they have helped to shape the contemporary landscape of the far right and white supremacy. To do so, it explores five examples – Savitri Devi, Elizabeth Tyler, Rotha Lintorn-Orman, Marine Le Pen and Jayda Fransen – examining the roles they played in neo-Nazism, the Ku Klux Klan, British fascism and the European far right. Each example is linked back to the modern day far right, looking at the lasting impression these women had on the movement in its current form, including shaping fascist thought architecture and providing a blueprint for movement-building.
This chapter takes the reader on the same journey that the author went on, in stumbling down an alt-right pipeline after watching a viral YouTube video from vloggers Girl Defined. It then explores the concept of digital radicalisation pipelines and how the alt-right used them to recruit young men at the height of the movement’s relevance. The chapter moves on to ask why and how women fall into alt-right pipelines and examines how significant a presence women have in the alt-right and far right. To do so, the chapter provides an explanation of what the alt-right and far right are, including how they differ and the factions within them. The chapter concludes by touching on some of the key roles women play within these communities and the historic precedence of their involvement.
This chapter seeks to introduce the reader to the concept of women in the far right as well as give context about digital radicalisation. It explores the history of the alt-right and how the movement recruited young men through algorithmic amplification. It then looks at the way in which women’s digital radicalisation has been underexplored, seeking to better understand the role that benevolent sexism and white supremacy has played in this. The chapter goes on to lay out the journey the book will take the reader on, touching on key points and introducing prominent figures including case studies and experts.
This book explores the role the internet plays in how women are radicalised into far-right communities and belief systems. To do so, it begins by examining the current landscape of the post-internet far right and considers the role that tech culture and misogyny has played in shaping the alt-right and the contemporary far right. The book then examines some key female figures in both the historic and contemporary far-right, including Savitri Devi, Marine Le Pen, and Lauren Southern, as a way to better understand women’s radicalisation. The heart of the book digs into digital radicalisation, looking at the types of content which are used to recruit women, as well as how the infrastructure of tech and social media itself helps to facilitate and even amplify this process. To conclude, the book examines the experiences of women in far-right communities, both on and offline, touching on the misogyny and violence they experience, before looking to the future to ask what can be done to address women’s radicalisation.