"This book examines the intersection between national and international counter-terrorism policies and civil society in numerous national and regional contexts. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) against the United States led to new waves of scholarship on the proliferation of terrorism and efforts to combat international terrorist groups, organizations, and networks. Civil society organizsations have been accused of serving as ideological grounds for the recruitment of potential terrorists and a channel for terrorist financing. Consequently, states around the world established new ranges of counter-terrorism measures that target the operations of cCivil society organizsations exclusively. Security practices by states have become a common trend and have assisted in the establishment of a “‘best practices”’ among non-liberal democratic or authoritarian states, and are deeply entrenched in their security infrastructures. In developing or newly democratized states (those still deemed democratically weak or fragile), these exceptional securities measures are used as a cover for repressing opposition groups considered by these states as threats to their national security and political power apparatuses. This book serves as a critical discussion accounting for the experiences of civil society in the enforcement of global security measures by governments in the America’s, Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, Europe (Western, Central, and Eastern), and the Middle East.
The post-9/ 11 global security regime and the securitization of civil society
Richard McNeil- Willson and Scott N. Romaniuk
This chapter maps the development of global security architecture in the context of the “new terrorism” security paradigm, and the impact this is having on civil society – creating challenges for community integration, securitizing political dissent, and potentially advancing fundamental social and economic inequalities. It argues that the inequalities of counter-terrorism represent an internalization of racism associated with colonialism into the heart of the Westernized (but not Western) state model through the language of security. This has blurred the line between what have been traditionally defined as “democratic,” “authoritarian,” and “hybrid” states to such an extent that they are rendered problematic in their usage in a counter-terror context. As such, more radical approaches to theorizing the relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism need to be considered.
Chapter 7 brings together the analysis of the three empirical chapters by
assessing the overall impact of proscription on the dynamics of getting to
the table in the case of Colombia. It goes on to assess the lingering
effects of proscription throughout the negotiation process and in the post
agreement phase. It argues that the intense polarisation and stigmatisation
accompanying the terrorist framing still remained an issue for the ongoing
transition of the listed armed group into political life and for longer-term
reconciliation efforts in Colombia.
The impact of security policy on civil society in the United States
William A. Taylor
This chapter explores the critical relationship between counter-terrorism (CT) policy and civil society in the United States. First, the chapter details the historical context of the pre-9/11 security environment within the United States and then discusses major security policies that the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted. This watershed event triggered seismic shifts in security policy aimed at combating international terrorism, and the resulting policy adjustments fundamentally altered civil society within the United States. Second, the chapter analyzes the various security frameworks established in the aftermath of 9/11 and considers their implications on the relations between the state and civil society in the United States. Third, the chapter considers the responses of CSOs to state CT policies. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of how civil society within the United States changed after 9/11 in response to security policy and a projection of likely future state–civil society relations.
Counter-terrorism and insurgency policies and civil society in Colombia
Saúl M. Rodriguez-Hernandez and Julio- César Cepeda- Ladino
Over more than fifty years Colombian society has undergone one of the most violent and bloodiest internal wars in the contemporary world, involving different actors like left-wing guerrillas, right-wing groups, and institutional forces. This situation, intertwined with the events of 9/11, which added to the strong relationship with the United States, aligned Colombian security policies in the line of counter-terrorist American actions, materialized locally as a counterinsurgency program. Known as “Democratic Security” (DS), this was coined by President Alvaro Uribe, unfolded between 2002 and 2010 and was continued by his successor Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2014), which in its first phase incorporated many American discourses, not only to respond to local threats but also to ask for economic and military support framed under the umbrella of “Plan Colombia.” DS showed its effectiveness against insurgent groups, mainly FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), which was useful to pressure this insurgency to begin a peace negotiation afterwards, however it has a dark side in civil society, including extrajudicial killings, the persecution of political opponents, a dirty war against some communities, and diplomatic tension with Venezuela. In this respect, this chapter describes and analyzes main aspects related to DS and its effects on civil society from a midterm historical perspective.
Chapter 2 describes the main international proscription regimes, their
characteristics, commonalities and differences. It delves into the previous
work published on proscription. After describing the possible material and
symbolic effects of proscription, it turns to exploring how the different
actors will be impacted.
Global security architectures and civil society since 9/ 11
Scott N. Romaniuk and Emeka Thaddues Njoku
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the so-called “new terrorism” security architecture created immense challenges for community integration, securitizing political dissent, and potentially advancing fundamental social and economic inequalities. The emergence of this new security architecture in the context of terrorism is also intricately linked to what has been referred to as the “age of counter-terrorism.” This chapter examines the development of global security architectures in the context of counter-terrorism (CT) in light of the development of the “new terrorism” security paradigm, and the impact this is having on civil society. It charts the foundation of these cross-national CT security structures – the overt security responses that took form between 2001 and 2006, which have since given way to a greater focus on preventative countermeasures – and explores the supporting discourses that have sprung up around this, before exploring how these bodies and discourses are changing and challenging contemporary politics in new and unexpected ways. This chapter further examines state-level CT as a set of military, discursive, physical, and economic structures.
A logical result of the swift increase in the listing of armed groups as
‘terrorist organisations’ following 9/11 would have been a reduction in the
number of settlements negotiated with these targets of proscription.
Instead, peace negotiations have continued. The introduction explores this
puzzle and argues that there is little understanding of how international
proscription affects negotiations and peace processes, and in particular how
it affects the process by which conflict parties get to the negotiation
table. The chapter draws on conflict and peace literature and critical
terrorism studies to situate the book in on-going debates and clarify the
terminology used. It goes on to lay out the research design and methodology.
The chapter concludes by highlighting the book’s overall argument and giving
an overview of the different chapters.
Chapter 4 explores the processes of vilification and de-vilification by
mapping and analysing the representations each conflict party – the
Colombian government and the FARC – made of the other over a 20-year period.
The chapter examines the language used, the associations made and how that
evolved over time during two pre-negotiation phases leading up to the Caguán
and Havana negotiations. The chapter argues that before proscription, each
conflict party was able to react to opportunities fluidly and shift language
accordingly. Following proscription, de-vilification gets stickier as
altering characterisations becomes harder and takes more time. This is
especially true of the government, which, having vilified its opponent in an
extreme way, cannot simply switch directly to de-vilification. First it has
to normalise its vilification – a concept described as a ‘linguistic
This chapter focuses on one of the fundamental issues in Nigeria since 9/11, as it relates to the role of counter-terrorism (CT) policy in civil society growth, development, and activism. The relationship between the Nigerian state CT policy and civil society is approached from two angles: the nature of the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) and the ways the Nigerian CT approach has impacted, negatively or otherwise, on the civil society. The event of 9/11, the article notes, ushered the international community into a new realm of collective actions against terrorism. At the national level, many countries have since then developed and introduced CT policies with the goal of confronting and combating the problem head-on. In Nigeria, the government has put in place a number of measures, including the enactment of terrorism prevention and anti-money laundering laws, as well as various other strategies, which have generated serious concerns with respect to how they limit and constrain the activities of civil society groups. However, it is noted that the prospects of a beneficial, mutually reinforcing relationship between civil society and state CT policy cannot be entirely foreclosed, but it would require a redesigning of the current CT structures and a reorientation of the civil society along the new paradigm in security-development thinking.