Politics

You are looking at 11 - 20 of 132 items for :

  • Manchester International Relations x
  • Manchester Political Studies x
  • All content x
Clear All

Why did the Russian take-over of Crimea come as a surprise to so many observers in the academic practitioner and global-citizen arenas? The answer presented in this book is a complex one, rooted in late-Cold War dualities but also in the variegated policy patterns of the two powers after 1991. This book highlights the key developmental stages in the evolution of the Russian-American relationship in the post-Cold War world. The 2014 crisis was provoked by conflicting perspectives over the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, the expansion of NATO to include former communist allies of Russia as well as three of its former republics, the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and the Russian move to invade Georgia in 2008. This book uses a number of key theories in political science to create a framework for analysis and to outline policy options for the future. It is vital that the attentive public confront the questions raised in these pages in order to control the reflexive and knee-jerk reactions to all points of conflict that emerge on a regular basis between America and Russia.Key topics include struggles over the Balkans, the expansion of NATO, the challenges posed by terrorism to both nations, wars fought by both powers in the first decade of the twenty-first century, conflict over missile defence, reactions to post-2011 turmoil in the Middle East, and the mutual interest in establishing priorities in Asia.

Models of power, systems theory, critical junctures, legacies, realism, and realism revised
James W. Peterson

There are five models that analysts have utilized in efforts to depict accurately the evolution of the Russian-American relationship from the late Cold War through the first part of the twenty-first century. While bipolarity characterized the early days of the Cold War, it yielded to a multipolar model in the last decades of that period. Post-Cold war patterns have centered on early American-centered unipolarity, re-emergence of multipolarity, and at times complex or chaotic patterms. In addition, five theories cast light on many of the details of the relationship. While legacy theory displays how some features of the communist past carry over into the post-communist period, the concept of critical junctures pulls our attention to key transitions in the political life and relationship of both powers. Debates about individual foreign policy decisions by both often center on the dialogue between realists and post- or revised-realist theoreticians.

in Russian-American relations in the post-Cold War world
A game-changing earthquake in the relationship
James W. Peterson

Rejection of assistance from the European Union (EU) and reliance instead on increased Russian connections, by the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych led to the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. As a result, the Russian ethnic group that held majority status in the Crimean Republic pushed for a referendum that led to its detachment from Ukraine and attachment to Russia. Russia held continuing military exercises along its border with Ukraine, and that activity fed the instability in the eastern border region of Ukraine. Western responses included a range of steps that entailed both diplomatic and military dimensions. Diplomatic contacts centered on two four-party Minsk Summits that resulted in an agreement called the Minsk Protocol. NATO led the military response that included relocation of western troops from southern Europe to the jeopardized area of northeast Europe. In addition, NATO also created a Spearhead Force of 5,000 troops that could quickly move into any threatened area in the future. Finally, western nations imposed economic sanctions on Russian personnel and institutions in an effort to bring about changed policies.

in Russian-American relations in the post-Cold War world
A mixed set of perceptions
James W. Peterson

Presidents Putin/Medvedev and Georgia W. Bush both adopted basically unilateralist approaches towards the three wars. There was commonality in all three wars, for each took place within ethnically divided states: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Georgia. Russia was wiling to permit American access to Central Asian air bases in republics that had previously been part of the Soviet Union. However, there was considerable controversy between the two over the Gergia war as well as the war in Iraq. Presidents Bush and Obama both utilized a common surge strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the final results in each were disappointing in terms of the continuing turmoil within the two nations. One positive feature of the effort in Afghanistan was support by NATO through its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whereas no allied naions provided help to Russia in its incursion into Georgia. Both nations incurred considerable costs, the Russians in global public opinion and the United States in considerable depletion of its treasury.

in Russian-American relations in the post-Cold War world
Carla Konta

This chapter builds on the expanding literature on the role of Cold War exhibitions in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the public worldwide. US participation in Yugoslav trade fairs was a matter of prestige for the organizers, a chance to improve economic relations and gain technological know-how. This chapter explores the role of exhibitions as public, cultural, and technopolitical diplomacy tools that functioned as ambassadors of the American dream, acts of bilateral political balancing, and platforms for prolific commercial trade. By analysing the most influential US exhibitions in Yugoslavia, from Atoms for Peace in 1955, to Industrial Design in 1970, the chapter argues that these left a compelling mark in the Yugoslav socioeconomic sphere, both for the establishment of Yugoslav grocery stores chains, as well as affirmation of Western-style consumerism. The chapter builds on Yugoslav periodical and newspaper records to examine Yugoslav reactions to the exhibitions. In the flow of previous scholarly studies, it examines the political values of images, commodities, and know-how that were used as Cold War cultural weapons by both American and Yugoslav leaders, Tito included.

in US public diplomacy in socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–70
Carla Konta

Scholars working on public or cultural diplomacy more broadly usually focused on specific musicians, music genres, or forms of art. Although based on previous studies, this chapter aims to look at music and art diplomacy from the angle of channels – usually festivals – personalities, and cultural diplomacy content. Grounded on archival records, newspapers, and interviews, the chapter shows that, in Yugoslavia, American jazz was a cultural Cold War weapon, possessing connotations of improvisation and freedom. It argues, contrary to what Vučetić asserted, that those jazz performers arrived in Yugoslavia mostly through private, financially favourable, arrangements. On the other hand, the State Department prioritized classical arrangements, from symphony orchestras to ballet. Unlike other USIS programs, the US Cultural Presentation Program was considered politically neutral. Nevertheless, together with Voice of America, it contributed to popularizing American jazz. On the other hand, it is Voice of America that was perceived as highly problematic, dangerous propaganda by Yugoslav Party commissions. Followed by 46 to 70 per cent of all radio listeners, VOA successfully exploited its public diplomacy function by enticing behaviour that was breaking implicit rules of the Titoist regime and, therefore, perceived as encouraging freedom.

in US public diplomacy in socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–70
Abstract only
Carla Konta

This chapter examines how Yugoslav reform policies, from the mid-1960s on, stemmed from Yugoslav leaders favouring decentralization and more economic freedom, as well as dissidents’ movements that brought critics of Yugoslav socialism into the Party and influenced public opinion. The chapter shows how the anti-LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) movements were never openly supported by the US government, nor calling for the US and Western liberal democracies to be their inspiration; but they were asking for more pluralism in the Yugoslav political and cultural arena. This convinced US policymakers and field officers to consider these requests to be inspired by US public diplomatic policies, striving to influence the regime from outside to entice change from within. The chapter addresses the US connections of many Yugoslav dissidents, such as Croatian Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Praxis philosophers, and Mihajlo Mihajlov, but also the Serbian Liberals. The chapter acknowledges how the renewed Tito–Nixon partnership, due to the threat of the Brezhnev Doctrine, shifted Yugoslav concern about American influence and incentivized excellent economic and cultural cooperation in the 1970s.

in US public diplomacy in socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–70
Abstract only
Carla Konta

This chapter synthesizes how US public diplomacy used soft skills in soft-power endeavours, and how the USIS mission flourished with reduced Yugoslav resistance to US influence, but only after accepting the American partnership that helped to stifle Soviet interference in the post-1948 assessment. The chapter analyses USIS interest in creating long-term networks, rather than undermining the Yugoslav dictatorship. Transnational connections with fellows and critical thinkers in the United States became crucial to Yugoslav dissident movements, as well as for the leadership involved in the Foreign Leader Program and other US exchange programs. The chapter also explains how Yugoslav experimentation with liberalization ended up being an oxymoron, and how US cultural penetration contributed to shaping that experiment. The chapter argues that mutual (dis)trust between the two partners over the decades resulted from their belonging to ideologically opposed factions; ultimately, this was overcome by pragmatism, realpolitik, and, to some extent, shared appreciation. The imposed, often arbitrary, limits to the American cultural agenda display both the Yugoslav regime’s invisible boundaries of coercion, and American keenness to overcome them.

in US public diplomacy in socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–70
Abstract only
Carla Konta

The chapter starts by exploring the complex US–Yugoslav ties in the post-1948 era: Eisenhower’s plan of ‘keeping Tito afloat,’ American support of Yugoslav independence from the Soviets, and the hardly justifiable partnership (from an ideological point of view) with the United States. It examines how Yugoslavia’s turn to neutrality helped restore US-Yugoslav relations to a point of appeasement that would become crucial for US cultural affirmation in post-war Yugoslavia. In such a context, public diplomacy turns into a weapon of soft power aimed at ‘converting’ Yugoslav leaders to the West and enforcing cooperation with the United States. While resulting in asymmetrical reciprocity favouring the United States, US public diplomacy never stopped being a simplified transmission–reception process, but rather represented a complex account of negotiations in the political, cultural, and social arena.

in US public diplomacy in socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–70
Carla Konta

The chapter analyses the general trends of US public diplomacy in Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s, shaped by Yugoslav foreign relations and international positioning towards the United States and the Soviet Union, and its internal Party–State interactions. It starts by looking at divergences between Washington-conceived policies and the Yugoslav ‘field,’ and feedback from the first inspection programs. It examines how public diplomacy programs evolved from Eisenhower’s bolder strategy to JFK’s flexible response. The chapter accentuates parallel processes and consequential decision-making: Yugoslav patterns of resistance to American propaganda and official permissiveness; the spillover of world events in USIS–Yugoslav relations; late-1950s negative reaction towards USIS and the 1960 Press Law; the USIA/USIS response of a harder leader’s line and advancement of the program in that direction; changing Yugoslav public opinion; political/cultural rapprochement with the West in the 1960s; and Yugoslav hesitation between openness and control in the issue of foreign public diplomacy. USIS regarded its work as successful, both because of its popularity among audiences, and because of liberal cultural trends that, following the 1953 and 1963 Constitutions, left them more liberty in working with Yugoslav cultural leaders.

in US public diplomacy in socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–70