Sarah L. Henderson, Scott N. Romaniuk, and Aliaksandr Novikau
The Russian Federation, similar to its predecessor, the Soviet Union, represents a classic case of repressive security. Typically for such systems, civil society usually plays a minimal role in the Russia’s security measures. Such weak involvement of civil society in security policies results in two opposite features of the Russia’s security system. On the one hand, a weak participation of civil society in state affairs, including security policies, means a weak capability to control security measures of the state that strengthens the hands of security agencies. On the other hand, a lack of cooperation between the state and civil society often hinders efforts to combat security threats. International terrorism and other global security threats have inevitably affected not only Russian security policies but also the relationships between the state and civil society. The state often uses the threats as justification for repressive security including the further exclusion of civil society from security policy-making.
There is a prevalent understanding that the Colombian government and the FARC
got to the negotiation table in Havana because the FARC were cornered and so
weak they had no other option – that military defeat forced them to the
negotiation table. Proscription, the logic would go, played a key part in
this by weakening the armed group. However, a closer look at these dynamics
through the lens of ripeness shows a different picture. While proscription
undeniably weakened the FARC, the chapter shows that by bolstering the
government to such an extent it also prevented it from perceiving a mutually
hurting stalemate. Moreover, proscription also worked against ripeness by
blocking the way out – neither the government nor the FARC have a political
exit to the armed confrontation. The chapter goes on to explore how these
challenges were overcome by going back to the concept of the ‘linguistic
ceasefire’. It adds the idea of the ‘political landing strip’, which
highlights the innovative roles played by international and local actors
Despite being a principal actor in the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) since 2001, Pakistan has lagged behind in drafting adequate counter-terrorism (CT) and security policies. The first framework for internal security was the National Internal Security Policy, drafted only in 2014. Following the attack on the Army Public School in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in December 2014, Pakistan devised its first official CT policy, the National Action Plan (NAP). The NAP has been criticized for being militaristic in nature, broad in its scope but limited in ideology and objectives, and selective in its implementation. In recent years, Pakistan has also drafted or amended a number of additional legal frameworks addressing terrorism which include the AntiMoney Laundering Act of 2010 for terrorism financing, Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act of 2010 for cyber-terrorism, and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 (including later amendments) and the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance of 2014 for a broad range of offenses. Overall, Pakistan’s CT infrastructure has been the subject of much debate, criticized for being indiscriminate, militarized, and providing sweeping powers to institutions of the state. This chapter takes a critical approach to Pakistan’s CT frameworks and delves into the implications these have on civil society, infringing upon human rights and limiting space for dissent, expression, and activism. In addition, it analyzes their impact on the financing of non-governmental organizations and the workings of international organizations within the country.
The end of Indonesia’s authoritarian political system in 1998 has opened the floodgates for various civil society organizations (CSOs) to organize themselves along ethnic, religious, and political lines. Some of these CSOs display voluntary, not for profit, and non-violent characteristics. These CSOs are important agents for change as they inform security sector reform agendas in Indonesia. However, not all CSOs that have thrived in post-authoritarian Indonesia demonstrate these “civil” traits; rather some CSOs display “military-like” features and are willing to use violence. Following the 9/11 attacks and the 2002 Bali bombing, in a bid to improve national counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, militarized CSOs began to play a greater role in security. Militarized CSOs’ engagement in security become more apparent in comparison to their “civil” counterparts as they participate in providing intelligence information, taking part in anti-radicalization efforts and helping the government to guard border regions. This chapter examines and compare the implications of national CT policy upon the emergence and role of CSOs that display “civil traits” and those that do not in Indonesia’s security sector after the 9/11 attacks.
The enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 and the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 in Kenya is a function of globalization processes, namely constitutionalism and the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). Since the enactment of these two laws in particular, civil society organizations (CSOs) in Kenya that advocate the rights of Muslims are increasingly becoming targets of state-led counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) that undermine their capacity to achieve their objectives. This chapter examines how the state has securitized such organizations so as to prioritize them as targets of CT policy. The state securitizes such organizations by constructing them as threats to the war on terror and national security. CTMs, therefore, target the leadership, programs, resources, and societal linkages of such organizations, hence undermining the capacity to protect the rights of Muslims in the war on terror in Kenya. The chapter recommends ways in which the securitization can be de-securitized without undermining the GWOT.
Egypt’s counter-terrorism policy post-9/ 11 and beyond
The political and security developments of the post-Arab uprisings, specifically in Egypt, lend credence to an “excessive” securitization approach toward the broader civil society, in comparison to the impact of the post-9/11 domestic and foreign context. These developments constituted a web of interrelated external and internal determinants that chiselled away the capacity of Egyptian civil society organizations (CSOs) to survive or adapt as they were stripped of any form of international, state, and societal support. This chapter argues that these determinants are: first, the rise of “populist leadership” after 2011, which gained significance through fostering the dichotomy between the “Egyptian people” and “independent CSOs” by associating CSOs with national security threats, i.e. terrorism. Second, the high incidence of national and regional terrorism post-2011 provided not only national but also international legitimacy to the excessive securitization of civil society. Resultantly, Egypt’s crackdown on CSOs and their exclusion from the governance process was largely ignored in favor of securing Egypt’s continued cooperation. This in turn led to a severe government mass crackdown, thereby shrinking the civic space in Egypt.
State security and its effects on civil society in Uganda
David Andrew Omona and Scott N. Romaniuk
This chapter argues that robust civil society activity in any country forms part of the conscience of the state and creates awareness in the citizenry so to hold their leaders accountable. This is only possible if there is an enabling environment or space for civil society such as free access to information, freedom of expression, opportunity to participate in a political process, freedom of assembly, and right to stage peaceful protests. However, over the years, the sociopolitical developments in Uganda have steadily facilitated the shrinking of space for civil society organizations (CSOs). In the guise of maintaining law and order, laws have been enacted to help monitor, control, and restrict the operations of civil society. The laws so enacted have invariably been used by the security agents to disperse, arrest, and torture whoever is seen going contrary to the established law – thus infringing on the basic democratic rights of citizens and affecting their security. This chapter, therefore, sets out to explore answers to key questions such as: what are the causes of shrinking space for civil society in Uganda; how does such shrinking space to civil society affect security; and what could be done to address this so to create an enabling conditions for the operation of civil society in Uganda?
This chapter examines the impact of British security policies on civil society and how it has shifted since 9/11. Current security politics are heavily influenced by global threats such as terrorism, organized and transnational crime. British domestic security policy is driven by the Clausewitzian notion that “to secure peace is to prepare for war.” We argue that such thinking, coupled with the politics of fear that has led to the securitization of British society, has far-reaching consequences, such as the erosion of our fundamental rights and liberties in preparation for the ever-evolving security challenges of the future. This securitization has become normalized, allowing the introduction of ever more authoritarian and repressive measures to “tackle” these “new security challenges.” Securitization has become an ideological tool of internal political repression, legitimizing the current neoliberal status quo and depoliticizing the masses. Current measures are undermining open democratic debates, our civil liberties such as the freedom of expression and privacy, and to some extent the freedom of the press. Securitization, we will argue, has increased our sense of insecurity and continues to have a negative effect on civil society. Rather than securitizing issues such as terrorism and organized crime, we should be looking to politicize them in non-security ways. Destroying the spirit of liberty and securitizing society will sow the seeds of despotism at our own door.
Chapter 1 argues that 9/11 and the passing of UN Security Resolution 1373 was
a turning point that embedded proscription regimes deeply in the
international system. The global reframing of a whole range of protracted
armed conflicts as wars against terrorists has affected local conflict
dynamics and their possible resolution. As the chapter goes on to explain,
this shift did not emerge overnight and there were a number of antecedent
concepts that laid the ground for it, but it was the first UN Resolution to
invoke the right to self-defence (Article 51 of Chapter VII) against a
non-state armed group.
Scott N. Romaniuk, Emeka Thaddues Njoku, and Arundhati Bhattacharyya
This chapter first looks at the emergence of civil society in Bangladesh. It then turns to how 9/11 ushered profound changes in the mindset of individuals regarding the capacity building of states for pre-empting terrorist activities and operations. Finally, it addresses the extent to which an increase in state control has affected the functioning of civil society. Hue and cry has come up from different sections of the civil society regarding blanket imposition of restrictions on free civil society operations. The chapter focuses on Bangladesh, which is facing terrorist strikes, particularly since 9/11.