One of the key foundations of the modern liberal democratic State is the requirement that government safeguards the security of its citizens by enacting and enforcing laws designed to protect their interests. In the name of security, however, and in particular in the context of the ‘war on terror’, this political obligation has been largely undermined by a common yet ultimately dangerous set of claims: necessity knows no law and, hence, one must fight fire with fire. Operations beyond legal boundaries have very often been legitimised by sweeping claims about global dangers and the necessity to derogate from the rule of law. Why and how a democratic government in a liberal society could turn to a ‘dirty war’ and go down the route of clandestine extra-judicial killing is a serious question. Spain’s war against ETA offers a fascinating case study that sheds important light on this fundamental and topical issue.
As a founding NATO member, and acutely aware of its vulnerability to invasion, Norway has remained highly supportive of a close security relationship with the US bilaterally and through the NATO alliance. At the same time, Norway has sought to reassure Russia that it would not base NATO forces on its territory, including US nuclear weapons. This meant that Norway abstained from most aspects of nuclear weapons cooperation in the NATO alliance. While Washington was prepared to accommodate Norway’s policy preferences regarding the non-stationing of NATO forces, Oslo approved the construction of facilities on Norwegian territory capable of supporting US and NATO nuclear operations against Russia.
Actions and actors of the Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups
The ambition of the GAL, expressed in a single and unique communiqué released in 1984, was twofold: avenging victims of ETA by killing members of the Basque organisation who found refuge in France and pushing French authorities to reconsider their generous political asylum and extradition policy and engage in greater co-operation with Spain in its fight against ETA. In the name of GAL, between 1984 and 1987, petty criminals, far-right Italian activists and Spanish pro-Francoist groups, as well as Spanish police officers and members of the ‘sharp end’ of the state military and security infrastructures, tortured or killed for relatively small amounts of money. Nearly thirty people were killed in a campaign of torture, kidnapping, bombing, targeted and indiscriminate assassinations of suspected ETA activists, Basque refugees and sometimes ordinary citizens, mostly carried out on French territory. Through a careful reading of Spanish and French court records, this chapter offers a detailed examination of the different actions and perpetrators involved in the GAL campaign, and the collusions and complicities it entailed.
The peace process in Northern Ireland has been widely praised for resolving the longest running post-war conflict in Europe. However, there is often misunderstanding about what happened in Northern Ireland and why. Drawing on a wide range of sources, this book offers an analysis of the origin, development and outcome of the peace process. It argues that the changes that Northern Ireland experienced from the early 1990s can only be understood if they are examined in the context of the time in which they occurred. It challenges some of the criticisms of the peace process that have emerged in recent years and argues these are based on either a misunderstanding of the purpose of the process or on information that was not available to the main actors at the time. The peace process was primarily an attempt to persuade those groups using violence to abandon their armed campaigns, rather than a specific attempt to create a fairer or more just society. The question became how this could be achieved and at what cost? The book charts and explains the ongoing challenges faced by Northern Ireland as it seeks to transition from a conflict to a post-conflict society. It highlights the lack of trust that has been a continuing and, at times, debilitating feature of the region’s politics since 1998. It concludes by considering the extent to which Brexit offers a challenge that might undermine the progress that has been made during Northern Ireland’s ‘messy’ and unpredictable peace process.
Chapter 2 focuses on (West) Germany as the single most important non-nuclear ally for the US in NATO. During the Cold War, West Germany remained central to debates within NATO about nuclear sharing and played a crucial role in promoting institutional integration in NATO that fostered compromise on nuclear cooperation, while at the same time creating mutual dependence with the US. NATO allies were dependent on the US release of nuclear warheads, but the US was dependent on allies’ cooperation to alter nuclear strategy in Europe. For (West) Germany, this mutual dependence provided a degree of influence that widened options to achieve national policy objectives. For NATO as a whole, mutual dependence meant that nuclear cooperation became so central to the alliance’s identity that it survived as a ‘nuclear alliance’ in the post-Cold War era.
From the start of the Cold War to the presidency of Donald Trump, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But cooperation on policy, strategy, posture and deployment of US nuclear weapons has varied significantly between US alliances and over time. Partners in Deterrence goes beyond traditional accounts that focus on deterrence and reassurance in US nuclear policy, and instead places the objectives and influence of US allies at the centre of analysis. Through a series of case studies informed by a rigorous analytical framework, it reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, Partners in Deterrence provides important lessons for contemporary policy makers and makes an essential contribution to existing scholarship on alliances and nuclear weapons.