Index
in Inside Accounts, Volume I

Index

Adams, Gerry 4041, 143144, 158159
attitude towards Anglo-Irish Agreement 9294
decommissioning issue 150151
Downing Street Declaration 131
how to negotiate with British 92
influence (limitations) 204, 238239, 246, 249
problems 9495
response to Canary Wharf 248
tested against de Valera (carrying followers) 172, 209, 247
US visa (1994) xiii, 6, 9, 239, 242, 244, 245, 246, 257
Adams–Lillis dialogues 7, 9194
Ahern, Bertie 112113, 179
alienation 67, 82, 98, 100
Alliance Party 9, 25, 26, 46, 197, 202203, 220
Alternative Assembly of NI people (Dungiven) 1920
Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) 32
aims re SDLP and Sinn Fein 56
British accommodation of Irish Government 5960
‘consent’ versus ‘self-determination’ principles 176
construction 5657
core principles, scope, limitation 6061
creation of East–West trust 106
drafts 82
failure to prevent advance of Sinn Fein 6162
formal and informal meetings of officials 60
formal announcement (scale of unionist hostility not envisaged) 89
implications 5758
importance 106
IRA 9495
Irish good faith 5758
key role played by United States 88
main message 78
nationalist reaction 61
negotiations 5657
origins and context 5556
political imagination 6696
popularity in Ireland 90, 106
possibilities of collapse 8081
pragmatic approach 78
principal aim successful 174
resolution of grievances 99
role of Irish Government 5859, 78
Thatcher’s opinion of 85, 89, 153, 186
unionist opposition 3, 7, 6162, 65, 100101, 104
Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 5859
armed struggle 100
Armstrong, Robert 79, 80, 84
Army Councils
loyalist 31
republican 178, 239, 247, 249
back-channels ix, 8, 4849, 156190, 232, 234, 235
ethical dimension 161
fear of indiscretion 171
limit 161
purpose 160161
Barry, Peter 32, 66, 98, 100
Belfast 9394
Blair, Tony 112113, 187, 211212
Bloody Sunday (1972) 46
Bloomfield, Ken 2122
Boland, Kevin 5051
Brighton bombing (1984) 3, 85
British Army 74, 122123
British Government
contacts with republicans 28, 149150, 152
inconvenient truths 136137
as negotiators 186187
policy on Ireland (unacknowledged truth) 153
presentational aspect 152
British ‘neutrality’ 166167
Brooke, Peter xiixiii, 5, 166
Brown, Gordon 124125
Browne, Des 124, 125
Bruton, John 4041, 252253
Bush, George W., President 120121
Butler, Sir Robin 128, 141
Cabinet and Cabinet Office
British 29, 54, 60, 68, 69, 73, 74, 76, 84, 105, 106
Irish 60, 124
Northern Irish 30
Cahill, Joe 6, 179, 221, 239, 245
‘calculability’ 213
Callaghan, Jim 36, 118, 166, 179
Canary Wharf bombing (1996) 144146, 177, 204
Carter, President ix, 38, 88, 153, 186, 254
Catholicism 116117
frameworks and process 222
‘reading between lines’ 217, 221222
civil servants/civil service
British and Irish compared 213215, 235236
Irish 54
Northern Ireland Office 7, 23, 86, 101, 102, 119
role 136
Clinton, President 242, 248249
access granted to Dick Spring 228
grasp of complexities 243244
Middle East peace effort (2000) 216
and Reynolds 242243
visit to NI (1995) xiv, 6, 178
compensation payments 21
conflict-resolution
‘moment of ripeness’ 220, 235
requirements 4
consent principle 5152, 176, 203204
Conservative Party 36, 152
constructive ambiguity 136, 246, 256
Cooper, Ivan (SDLP) 16, 20
Cosgrave, Liam 20, 36, 37
Council of Ireland 3133, 4950
courts 39, 67, 68, 73, 74, 8283, 84
Cowen, Brian 113, 115116, 124
creativity 8, 10, 184185, 210211
Cruise O’Brien, Conor 52
Dail ix, 20, 29, 66, 90, 174, 251
Dalton, Tim 214, 248
De Klerk, F. W. 201, 223
de Valera, Eamon 38, 62, 71, 104, 115, 137, 144, 172
decommissioning 149151, 178180, 187188, 237241, 249
failure to be included in Good Friday Agreement 240
pragmatism (risks) 237238
‘putting arms beyond use’ (phraseology) 252
Sinn Fein discussions with Irish rather than British 240241
symbolism 151
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) xiii, 99, 101, 111, 112, 114, 116, 124, 165
formal meeting with Irish Government (London, 2005) 108109
left peace talks (1997) 182
stance on decommissioning 188
Department of Foreign Affairs viiix, 14, 17, 41, 47, 54, 60, 103104, 116, 178, 191192, 230
Anglo-Irish Division 110, 128, 191
Department of the Taoiseach viii, 41, 74, 97, 110, 160, 197
devolution 44
divided society 44
Doherty, Pat 158, 172
Donlon, Sean viii, 67, 1442
background 1415
contacts with British 1517
contacts with Paisley 27
contacts with unionists 17
early meetings with SDLP 20
fear of British withdrawal from NI (1974) 34
mandate 15
policies towards paramilitary organisations 201
role (1972–3) 17, 25
Dorr, Noel viii, 7, 4365, 73
Irish Ambassador in London viii, 59, 60
‘Political Director’ (April 1974–) 52
double-dealing (British) 122
Downing Street Declaration (1993) 56, 8, 130, 231
audience targeted 132133
charge of ‘ambiguity’ contested 132
clarification requested by Sinn Fein 169170
differences from initial Hume–Adams text 168
first-mover advantage 131
foundations for peace process 232
internal pressures on Sinn Fein leadership 165166
no British secret deal with IRA 164
drafting 214217
East–West link 5354, 98, 118120
European context 107108
impact of unionist backlash to Anglo-Irish Agreement 100101
‘eleventh-hour moment’ 220
emotion 234
empathy 183
endgame 174
Enniskillen bombing (1987) 159160, 164165, 173174
European Council 79, 84
Major–Reynolds bilateral meeting (1993) 169
European Economic Community 3738, 52, 107108
Irish accession (1973) 15, 37, 47
European Parliament 108
European Union viii, 110, 111, 166
‘executive’ 2223
extradition 25, 48, 97, 157
Fair Employment 151, 153, 155
Falklands War 54, 66, 97, 186
Faul, Father D. 15, 96, 98, 116
Faulkner, Brian 23, 30
fear 4950, 226
Fianna Fail 32, 50, 58, 61, 62, 75, 9091, 128, 143, 156, 164, 165, 172, 199
rejected Anglo-Irish Agreement 103, 104
Fine Gael 58, 75, 9091, 116
Fitt, Gerry 16, 19, 20, 26, 46
FitzGerald, Garret 5556, 7172
‘alienation’ theme (post-hunger strikes) 55, 56
Anglo-Irish Agreement 103, 174
autobiography 82
background (family links with NI) 82
Hume’s influence 1819
IRA (no contact, 1982–85) 99
Thatcher meetings (under cloak of European Council) 79
urgency (post-hunger strikes) 6769
Foreign Office 16, 22, 25, 47, 66, 86, 119, 123, 196
Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (1994–96) 89
benefit achieved by Sinn Fein 207
boycotted by unionist parties 197, 202203, 206
Chairperson 197
final report never published 203
formal contact with Sinn Fein 196197, 198
formation and purpose 194
informal contacts (importance) 208
leverage on unionists 206
membership 197198
opening 197198
public participation 199200, 201
‘really for Sinn Fein’ 205
significance 207208
Sinn Fein ‘made significant gestures’ 205206
strands 199
terminated by Canary Wharf bombing 204205
Four Horsemen ix, 8788, 106, 153
Frameworks Document (1995) 130, 133134, 232
Gallagher, Dermot viiiix, 9, 214, 228255
background 228229
and Haughey
first meeting (1987) 229, 230
speech drafted (1990) re Anglo-Irish Agreement 229231
role in peace process 228
Gallagher, Eamonn 14, 15, 16
general elections: British
(February 1974) 35, 4950
(1997) 179, 180
general elections: Irish
(1987) 174
(1997) 180
Germany 213
Good Friday Agreement/Belfast Agreement (1998)
Anglo-Irish Agreement of ‘seminal importance’ 6162
brevity 252
closeness of British and Irish Governments 241
collapse feared 112
conversation versus documentation 245246
‘design exercise’ 219
implementation 109117, 258259
keeping negotiations within ‘framework’ 241
preamble (mood-setting) 216217
seeing situations through different lenses 218
Sinn Fein demands (eve of signature) 172173
strategic thinking 218
three strands 221, 225, 232233, 247, 256257
turning point 211212
US role 245
Goodall, David 6677, 79, 80, 84, 86
Green Paper (1972) 17, 21, 22, 4344, 45, 47
Hailsham, Lord 82, 84
harmonisation 2223, 106, 133134, 232
Haughey, Charles
and Anglo-Irish Agreement 6263, 9091, 229231
back-channels 156163
forging of East–West relationship 5354
good start with Thatcher (1979–80) ‘went awry’ 5354, 66, 103
Heath, Ted 22, 2627
Hermon, Sir John 8687, 100, 102
Hillery, Patrick 14, 16, 20, 35
history 219
Holland, Mary 82, 9193
human relationships 117118
Hume, John 4142
Anglo-Irish Agreement 64, 174
articles in Irish Times (1964) 1819
before Anglo-Irish Agreement 7374
determined Irish Government policy (1969–76) 1819
influence of New Ireland Forum 195
intellectual leader of SDLP 19, 20
key importance 104
nationalism ‘more about people than land’ 104
‘pioneering vision and courage’ 196
relations with Fitt 19
Hume–Adams dialogues (1988) 4041, 95, 126127, 169, 195196
Hume–Adams document (1988) 127130, 138
hunger strikes
‘created Sinn Fein as political entity’ 118
‘defeated by families of hunger strikers’ 9596
effect on Thatcher 107
fear of breakdown in South 67
impact on Anglo-Irish relationships 5556
Hurd, Douglas 72, 100
ideology 188189
internal settlement 3, 46
international dimension 38
International Fund for Ireland 120, 153, 186
internment xii, 15, 19, 28, 39, 43, 44, 45
interviews xi, 1, 256
credibility 10
interpretation 1011
lessons derived 256259
process of assumption and discovery 11
themes 910
Ireland (Republic Of Ireland)
ambassador withdrawn from London (1972) 1516
dealing with British 103104
Irish Constitution 33, 80
Boland court case (post-Sunningdale) 5051
violated by Anglo-Irish Agreement (McGimpsey case) 101
Irish Constitution: Articles Two and Three 3134, 234235, 237
nationalists in North 7475
place in British thinking 7172
Irish dimension 7, 2122, 3940
fermentation 4365
meaning 44
North–South link 4647
Irish Government 40
fear of unilateral British withdrawal from NI 5253, 143
formal meeting with DUP (London, 2005) 108109
‘had to be part of NI solution’ 61
‘institutional role in relation to direct rule’ (Anglo-Irish Agreement) 55
maintenance of independent perspective 141142
negotiating methods 119
perceptions (Blair versus Major) 251
policing issue 115116
policy (determined by Hume, 1969–76) 1819
pragmatism towards partition (Anglo-Irish Agreement) 103, 104
pre-Sunningdale policy themes 4345
pressure on Faulkner (1973) 23
reaction to failure of Sunningdale 52
reaction to ‘Irish dimension’ idea 2122
record-keeping 147
relations with SDLP 18, 202
relationship with NI nationalists (1982–85) 9899
and Sinn Fein
need for direct contact with (1990) 168
no contact with 28, 116, 182
view of leadership 142
thinking about IRA (Sunningdale era) 4849
would have lacked influence in peace process if merely British puppets 141142
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 2021, 42, 4849
Anglo-Irish Agreement 9495
‘complex relationship’ with Sinn Fein 142143
contacts with British Government (1970s) 28
efficacy of armed struggle in question 9495
focus always ‘Brits out’ 2728
isolation and neutralisation (aim) 39
military stalemate 173, 185
not main driver of Irish Government attitudes (1968–73) 29
pan-nationalist consensus 164
recruitment waves 16, 28
threat to Irish security 7778
transition to politics (unique) 173
IRA ceasefires
(1994–96) 170171, 173, 174178, 181182
(1997–) 179182
‘permanence’ issue 148
Irish Times 18
judges 82, 99
justice system 99
Kashmir 94
Kennedy, Edward ix, 38, 88, 243
King, Tom 86, 100, 166
Kirwan, Wally 197, 207
Labour Party (Ireland) 58, 75
Labour Party (NI) 197
Labour Party (Westminster) 19, 34, 36, 169
Lake, Anthony 145, 249
language 226, 233234, 236, 252
lawyers 26, 83, 99, 117
leaks 31, 34, 80, 131, 160, 252
Lebanon 26, 81
Libya 150, 157
Lillis, Michael ix, 7, 6696
on British flexibility 94
FitzGerald–Thatcher meetings 8485
meetings with Adams 9194
Lisburn shootings (June 1997) 180
listening 113, 117, 119120, 121, 131, 157, 158, 246
‘Log’ 118119
London: Irish Embassy 59, 108117, 124
loyalist paramilitary organisations 29, 42, 49, 50, 87, 95, 117, 180
ceasefires (1994) 6, 207
neutralisation (aim) 39
Lynch, Jack 14, 16, 20, 22, 35, 37
meetings with Heath (1971) 16, 45
open telegram to Heath (1971) 4344
McCartney, Robert 112, 114, 182
McGuinness, Martin 143145
back-channels (1992) 162163
decommissioning issue 150151
influence (limitations) 204, 238, 246, 249
McLaughlin, M. 158, 172
Major, John 141
‘better negotiator than politician’ 178
constraints 152
dependence on UUP at Westminster 193194
insistence on permanence of IRA ceasefire 217218
as negotiator 187
political weakness 145, 179, 232, 251
Mallon, Seamus 115, 196
elected MP (1986) 100, 102
opposition to Hume–Adams dialogues 105
Mandelson, Peter 115, 188
Mansergh, Dr Martin ix, 8, 110, 128, 130, 143, 156190, 214
British ‘not neutral’ 166
meetings with Sinn Fein: (1988) 156157, 164165, 174
(1992) 162164
never met Sinn Fein with SDLP present 167168
Sinn Fein rejection of Downing Street Declaration 170
Maryfield: Anglo-Irish Secretariat (1985–) 104
Mayhew, Patrick 238239
media 117, 123, 135, 170, 171, 180, 198
metaphors 226227, 234
Middle East 216, 234
Mitchell, George 153, 212213, 234
moderates 99100
displacement by extremists 151152
Molyneaux, James 101, 132, 133, 179, 206, 254
Montgomery, Rory 197, 207, 228
Mowlam, Mo 134, 180, 188
Moynihan, Pat ix, 38, 88
Murray, Father Raymond 15, 98, 116117
Nally, Dermot 17, 23, 24, 25, 60, 66, 69, 73, 81, 87, 128, 141
Napier, Oliver 26, 46
Navan Fort 119
Neave, Airey 55, 67, 97
negotiation
ability to predict problems 211
application of pressure 224225
becoming advocate for adversary 201202, 223
blocking exits 138
coded messages 236
common ground (means of determination) 137138
‘compromise’ versus ‘concession’ 244245
‘critical minimum’ versus ‘sufficient consensus’ 216
critical minimums and expectations of change 191227
finding ‘something everybody could live with’ 210220 passim
first draft of document 237, 250
‘floors’ metaphor (O’Connor) 212
‘fluidity’ (willingness to strike agreements) 182183
‘for good of process’ 245
formal and informal communication 135
‘had to have core principles’ 250251, 256
importance of texts 135
Irish concern with managing irreconcilable positions 215
keeping in view end of process 233
management of dialogue 228255
momentum of process 251252, 257
outside influence (value) 251
‘pieces of paper’ versus ‘dialogue in room’ 139
positional bargaining 225
pragmatism versus principle 253
presentational ruses (best avoided) 138139
problem of text (style of writing) 252
process (compromise) 205206, 208209
process amenable to required outcome 140
question of detail 254255
redrafting process 138
sensitivity 224
‘setting out framework’ 254
‘simplicity’ to one, ‘anathema’ to another 224
single-text 253254
skills 244
‘strategy’ versus ‘tactics’ 253
struggle over text to reach common outcome 140141
surprises 172
text becoming ‘wrecking mechanism’ 139
toughest discussions ‘with your own side’ 201
new beginnings 250
republican versus unionist outlook 249
New Ireland Forum (1983–84) 5859, 7576, 194195
influence on Hume 195
Irish reunification (ultimate aim) 63
Newry 118, 171, 188
no-man’s-land proposal 58, 74, 76, 79
non-violence principle 8, 126131 passim, 143, 149, 151, 154, 159164 passim, 193, 195, 257
North–South institutions 45, 17, 192, 211, 249
North–South link/strand xiii, 25, 4647, 48, 49, 53, 98, 232, 256
Northern Bank robbery 112, 114
Northern Ireland
British withdrawal 2, 34, 5253, 73, 143, 164166, 170
election (1973) 22, 26
lessons from other conflict situations 154
‘remains in delicate, fragile state’ 125
status (lack of agreement at Sunningdale) 2425
unionist/nationalist classification (need to escape) 155
Northern Ireland Executive
Good Friday Agreement 117, 185, 249, 256
Sunningdale 48, 50
Northern Ireland Office 60, 68, 72, 73, 80, 168, 177
Anglo-Irish Agreement 8182, 8687, 106, 119
O hUiginn, Sean x, 8, 41, 126155, 228, 253
contacts with Sinn Fein leaders 143144
role in drafting DSD and Frameworks Document 130
unionist antipathy ‘unfair’ 148
O’Ceallaigh, Daithi ix, 78, 86, 97125
Ambassador in London (2001–07) ix, 7, 97, 108117
background 97, 102
involvement in peace process 9798
‘strictly forbidden to talk to republicans’ 117
O’Connor, Tim xi, 89, 191227, 228
assessment of Sinn Fein’s approach 193
background (involvement with NI, 1986–) 191192
role as civil servant (subordination to political leaders) 227
‘talking to people on the ground’ 192193
O’Neill, Tip ix, 22, 38, 88
Paisley, Dr Ian 27, 123
as MEP (working with Hume) 108
sense of humour 109
US pressure 121
work for constituents 108109
paramilitary organisations ix, xii, 37, 130, 141, 149, 154, 192
attempt to marginalise 49
parity of esteem 151
partitionism 75
Patten Report (policing) 115, 188, 251
peace process 9798
chronology xiixiv
core lessons and principles 224
danger of collapse 150151
drawing extremists into mainstream 116, 256, 257
‘economic dividend’ 124
formal versus informal negotiations 115
formality and intensity 231
foundations and principles 126155
inclusivity 156, 258
Irish worries and misgivings 154155
key documents (1973–98) xvi
key drivers 257
maintenance 257258
origins 156
‘political process with moral ending’ (Gallagher) 255
role of United States 152154
spontaneity 121
‘unquestionably about phases’ 212213
peace-making 34
persuasiveness 119120
police (Garda Siochana) viiiix, 78, 80
potential deployment in NI 71, 7376
Police Service of Northern Ireland
SDLP support 111112, 114
policing 113115, 187188, 238
issue not resolved at Sunningdale 48
political culture (Irish) 253254
political imagination 6696
politicians (role) 136
Powell, Enoch 67, 90
Powell, Jonathan 110, 112, 115, 119, 136, 184, 187
decommissioning issue 240241
power-sharing 1442
explanation (‘partnership government’) 45
Irish dimension 17, 45, 48
power-sharing Executive 78
pragmatism 103104, 199, 208209
balance with ‘principle’ 210, 212
press conferences 59
‘principle of no surprises’ (O’Connor) 211
Prison Service (NI) 98, 101, 116
prisons and prisoners 80, 95, 96, 118, 156, 175, 189, 250
Protestants 107
‘of the word’ 222
reading the lines 217, 222
psychology 4, 8, 140, 146, 173, 224, 254
public opinion 131, 161
Pym, Francis 2627
Reagan, Ronald 38, 39, 8789, 120, 153, 186
Real IRA (1997–) 172, 177, 189
red lines 115, 129, 134135, 183, 187, 210, 212, 247, 249250
referenda 3132, 34, 57, 72, 81, 143, 233, 236
in Northern Ireland re united Ireland (Green Paper, 1972) 45
Reid, Father Alec 156168, 174
on ‘alternative method’ 158
republicans
constraints on compromise 146147
‘static defensive’ versus ‘more dynamic’ positions 147
Reynolds, Albert
back-channels 161, 163
and Clinton 242243
fall (effect on Sinn Fein) 177
negotiating style 231232
thinking of final goal rather than process 141
urgency 168170
rhetoric (in peace process) 225226
‘Ripeness is all’ (maxim) 146
risk 117, 218219
roads 36, 118, 175, 187
Robinson, Peter 101, 117, 206
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 73, 75, 8687, 93, 98, 99, 100, 114, 180
divisive in NI 74
upheld Anglo-Irish Agreement 102
St Andrews Agreement (2006) 78, 111, 116, 123, 135
Sands, Bobby xii, 2, 174
security 3, 69, 71, 7375, 77, 82, 83, 185
co-operation 35, 55, 56, 80, 102
forces 86, 99, 117, 180, 189, 192, 239
self-determination principle 128130, 163164, 176, 204
settlement of 1920–21 14, 37, 43, 44, 70, 90, 112, 136, 140, 175, 176, 221
Sinn Fein
abstentionism (abandoned, 1986) 130
accepted into mainstream (1994) 194
access to White House 242243
adjusting to multi-party negotiation (Forum for Peace, 1994–96) 89
Anglo-Irish Agreement 56, 65
attempt to develop pan-nationalist front (mid-1980s) 105106
attitude to Bruton (three phases) 177178
benefit derived from Forum for Peace 207
boosted by hunger strikes 67, 71, 116
British withdrawal demand 164166, 170
broadcasting ban (1988–94) xii, xiii, 170, 172
‘could have got a deal five years earlier’ (discussed) 187
‘detail’ versus ‘symbolism’ 172173
dialogue with Irish Government 144
direction of travel (1986–88) 130131
‘eleventh-hour moments’ 220
fear of engagement 142
formal rejection (July 1994) of DSD 170, 173
Forum for Peace and Reconciliation 196206
had to be offered viable alternative to violence 131
and IRA (‘complex relationship’) 142143
learning from others 202
McCartney murder and Northern Bank robbery (denial of responsibility) 114
managing change 209
need for ‘momentum’ 182, 187
need to keep IRA on board peace process (fear of split) 189190, 247
as negotiators 113, 115116, 144, 182, 247
opposition to Anglo-Irish Agreement 61, 103106
origins of peace process 126128
‘over-negotiation’ charge 115
pace of peace process 146
papers (1988) 126, 127128
policing issue 113114, 122
political advance 6162, 149
pragmatism 199, 200, 201
presentational aspect 152
‘problems with long-term planning’ 184
‘religious cult-like nature’ 144
rise xii, 2, 69, 190
ROI general election (1987) 174
search for nationalist consensus 164
self-determination concept 129130
as strategists 188189
tactics 142143
thinking (evolution over years) 189
transition to pragmatism 208209
use of interlocutors to clarify their own position 171
relationship with UUP 223
‘wanted oral and written communication’ 183184
Sinn Fein leadership 142
collective 171
need to carry followers 172, 175, 209210
politburo structure 171, 189
‘small had better be smart’ (Irish proverb) 222
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)
Anglo-Irish Agreement 56, 64, 89, 101
art of negotiation 26
attitudes towards paramilitary organisations 2021
closeness to Irish Government 202
constitution 18, 19
deteriorating relations with Sinn Fein (1997) 181
electoral strength in NI (1980s) 105
even-handedness between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael 90
formal positions 1920
Good Friday Agreement 221
offer to ditch Council of Ireland idea 3233
origins of peace process 126128
outmanoeuvred by Sinn Fein 115116
papers (1988) 126, 127128
policing issue 111112, 114, 115
policy 18
relations with Irish Government 18, 23, 29, 47, 98
Sunningdale 23, 25
social networks 120
socialism 185186
sovereignty xiii, 53, 59, 70, 76, 77, 81, 89, 94, 95, 129, 136
Spring, Dick 66, 145, 148, 149, 178, 213, 228
Stormont 19, 45, 221
Stormont prorogation (1972) 16, 17, 22, 32, 45, 48
‘sufficient consensus’ 9, 216
Sunningdale (1973) viii, 1, 3, 6, 1442, 78, 135, 232, 258
attempts to resurrect 32
background 4347
constructive ambiguity 24
drafting 2526
drafting of communiqué 2425
drafts (and Irish amendments) 4748
first stage of projected two-part conference 49
formal purpose 4647
interlude until Anglo-Irish Agreement 32, 5253
lessons 219
missed opportunities 67
not an ‘agreement’, merely a ‘press release/communiqué’ 2425, 49, 51
physical organisation of negotiations 25
reasons for failure 4951
resistance 31
unionist opposition 23
winners and losers 23
Sunningdale failure 2728, 2938, 40, 57, 89, 256
blame game 52
disintegration of Irish hopes 52
worsening of violence 29
symbolism 57, 122, 151, 172173, 193, 220221, 257
talking (‘so important’) 118
‘talking to terrorists’ 223
taxation 185
Teahon, Paddy 41, 214, 228229
television 59, 69, 87, 169, 198
Thatcher, Margaret 6368
Anglo-Irish Agreement (negotiation phase) 8081
biography by Moore 64
determination to uphold Anglo-Irish Agreement 93, 100, 102
did not like word ‘alienation’ 55
failure to acknowledge IRA threat to ROI 7778
grasp of detail (assessed) 6364
opposition to joint authority 7576, 81
‘Out, out, out’ comment 59, 79, 81, 8788, 120
psychology 8586
relations with Haughey 5354, 66
US pressure 8889, 120
Thomas, Sir Quentin 128, 130, 135
totality of relationships (Haughey, 1980) 5, 53, 54, 134, 230
Trimble, David 225226
Downing Street Declaration 132
‘good negotiator’ 234
handwritten note from Blair (Good Friday Agreement turning point) 211212
‘tremendous courage, but not particularly astute’ 122
US pressure 120
Tripartite Conference (1971) 43, 44
Troubles (1968–) xiixiv, 1, 14
trust 7980, 106, 246
Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) 39, 86, 98, 118
Ulster Unionist Council 30, 225226
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)
relationship with Sinn Fein 223
remained committed to peace process (1997) 213
sense of failure 221
Ulster Workers’ Strike (1974) xii, 30, 35, 9394
unionism
interests dominant (1974–85) 78
‘really difficult paradigm’ 224
unionist veto 8990, 203
unionists 229230
Anglo-Irish Agreement 8991, 93, 101102
art of negotiation 26
constraints on compromise 146147
‘eleventh-hour moments’ 220
failure of majoritarian rule 103, 104
failure to prepare followers for change 223224
fear of nationalist consensus 164
fragmentation 147
negotiating skills at Sunningdale 2324
‘negotiation’ equivalent to ‘surrender’ 223
negotiation to ‘eleventh hour’ 223
plain-speaking ‘for export only’ 137, 147
principles 250
unwillingness to put intellectual rationale on table (abandoned) 206
united Ireland 159, 175176, 195, 233
United Nations viii, 24, 49, 51, 87, 107, 131, 238
Security Council viii, 54
United States 3839, 120121, 239
Congress 139, 154
importance in peace process 186
Irish-American lobby 152153, 185186, 242243
perception of negotiations 241243
pressure on Thatcher 8889
Protestant Irish element 121
role in peace process 152154
role more important in 1990s than pre–Anglo-Irish Agreement 120
socialism of Sinn Fein 247248
State Department 22, 88, 152, 186
‘victims of violence’ 199, 201
violence 21, 42, 98, 104, 105
de-legitimisation 4
Irish antipathy 105
Washington Three 139, 148149, 150, 155, 178
Westminster Parliament 19, 185
House of Commons 70, 85, 109, 239, 251, 254
Northern Ireland by-elections (1986) 100, 101102
Whitelaw, William 16, 2627, 46, 50
contacts with IRA (1972) 28, 48
Wilson, Harold 29, 52, 78
hostility to Sunningdale 30, 33, 34, 50
not trusted by Irish Government 3537
possible British withdrawal from NI 2, 34
and Ulster Workers’ Council Strike 35, 9394
wreath-laying 122123
zero-sum mentality 57, 65, 134, 147
zones of convergence 134135

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Inside Accounts, Volume I

The Irish Government and Peace in Northern Ireland, from Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement

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